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phenomenology of Untouchability
Sundar Sarukkai
This paper explores the philosophical foundations of 
untouchability through an analysis of the 
phenomenology of “touch”. The sense of touch is unique 
in many ways; one such is the essential relation between 
touch and “untouch”. Drawing on both Indian and 
western traditions, the paper begins by analysing the 
meaning of touch and then goes on to explore some 
meanings of “untouchable”. It then concludes by 
pointing out the importance of untouchability within 
the brahmin tradition and attempts to understand the 
process of supplementation which makes untouchability 
a positive virtue for the brahmins and a negative fact 
for the dalits. 
Untouchability refers to certain practices of the “upper” castes such as refusing to touch or share water with p eople who have been called the “Untouchables” and 
who are today collectively called dalits. These sets of practices 
involve not only proscriptions on both groups of people but are 
often j ustified through n otions of purity and related concepts.1
For many social commentators the practice of untouchability 
characterises the Hindu civilisation. But what exactly constitutes 
this practice? While there have been tomes written on the socio­
logy and politics of this practice, there is little of significance on 
the philosophical foundations of this practice. Such a philoso­
phical reflection is made all the more urgent given the magnitude 
of the problem and its direct impact on modern Indian society. 
In this paper, I will explore the various meanings of untoucha­
bility and analyse how these have relevance to a broader concep­
tualisation of untouchability as a social practice. I begin with the 
phenomenology of touch, drawing from both the Indian and 
western philosophical traditions. The philosophical engagement 
with touch seems to always require the notion of the untoucha­
ble. In a sense then, the idea of the untouchable is at the core of 
the “touchables” – not so surprisingly then, we find that untouch­
ability is actually an essential marker of brahminhood. I will con­
clude by arguing that the displacement of this characteristic of 
untouchability from the brahmins to the untouchables illustrates 
not just the “outsourcing” of untouchability but also a philosophi­
cal move of supplementation.  
1 the sensation of touch
Touch is one of the five senses of the human body. While it is 
o ften believed that sight is the dominant sense, ancient traditions 
in different cultures emphasised touch as the most important 
sense. In particular, and of special importance in the context of 
untouchability, the Indian traditions considered touch as an im­
portant sense; in some schools, touch was the most important 
sense. This is also echoed in other philosophical and scientific 
traditions. Many biologists consider touch as the “greatest sense” 
in the body and skin as the most important organ.
Paradoxically the skin was not studied in great detail till the 
middle of the last century. Also there is a surprising lack of the 
role of the skin in poetry and when found in prose most often it is 
associated with pathologies, such as blotches, pimples and so on 
(Montagu 1971; Connor 2004 and Classen 2005). This is ironic 
considering the fact that while we can conceivably learn to live 
without our other senses such as seeing and hearing it is impos­
sible to live without having the sensation of touch. Drawing upon 
the experience of Helen Keller, Montagu points out that “when 
other senses fail, the skin can to an extraordinary degree 
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c ompensate for their deficiencies” (Montagu 1971: 7). Psychologi­
cally, the importance of touch has been widely recognised. 
E xperiments on animals have shown that newborn babies who 
are not touched or licked by their mother have a greater mor­
tality rate. As Jablonski (2006) notes, the special significance of 
skin, fingers and touch was not just in helping animals and 
h umans find food but also in creating social bonds. The relation­
ship between “care” and touching is also very important.  
In the western tradition, Aristotle’s views on touch have been 
influential. Aristotle’s view on the senses is based on defining 
senses by reference to sense­objects and in so doing he is also fol­
lowing Plato (Sorabji 1971: 58). Aristotle offers two criteria that 
were used to characterise touch: “contact criterion” and the “non­
localisation criterion”. Direct contact with a body characterises 
touch. In the De Anima, Aristotle notes that “all things that we 
perceive when in contact with them we perceive by touch” and 
“what is perceived by touch is directly contacted”  (ibid: 70). The 
other senses such as seeing, hearing and smell “are never exer­
cised through direct contact” whereas taste is only exercised thus 
and therefore, for Aristotle, taste is a form of touch. Touch was 
the most basic sense without which animals would not be able to 
survive but Aristotle believed that sight was the most superior 
sense (Paterson 2007). 
In viewing touch as contact we might forget the presence of 
the medium which is essential for any idea of touch. To touch is 
to move towards an object, to bring surfaces into contact. There­
fore, “to touch is to approach or to be approached” (Chrétien 
2004: 88). In the sensation of touch, the distance which charac­
terises the objects of touch is forgotten and so also the ever­ 
present minute distance between surfaces of contact. Not only 
is this forgotten but without the constant recreation of this 
distance there is no possibility of sensing touch. We can under­
stand the phenomenological significance of the act of touch in 
this context. What is the difference between touching a thing 
and being a part of that thing? Is my hand touching the shoulder 
joint where it is attached to? Does it touch in the same way that 
one hand touches another or one hand touches an object? The 
question of touching of a part to another part (both of which 
compose a whole) is different from the touching between two 
objects. What characterises this difference – the ever­present 
space/medium/body between the two objects which are in con­
tact? Touch is more than contact because of the ever­present, 
inerasable space between the objects of touch. It is this manipu­
lation of this intervening medium that constitutes the different 
textures of touch. It is also this ever­present medium which is 
untouchable in the act of touch. Thus, the idea of untouchability 
is always present, always contiguous to the act of touch. The 
notion of untouchability is all the more interesting because 
we are always in the process of touching even when we do not 
act to touch. 
2 interpreting Untouchability in indian context
The Indian views on contact and touch offer a different set of pos­
sibilities to understand these terms. First of all, there is in general 
a clear distinction made between touch (sparśa) and contact 
(saṁyoga).2 Moreover, touch is a quality of substances 
(Datta 2008: 130). Qualities are those that inhere in substances 
only, are not in contact with anything and have something inher­
ing in them. The last clause (of having something inhering) ex­
cludes universals satisfying other three conditions. (As another 
example of a quality, consider motion. Motion is a quality that 
inheres in material substances.)
Material substances have finite dimension, are capable of 
m otion and defined in terms of contact. One standard classifica­
tion of nine primary substances includes five which are material 
and four which are not. The five are earth, water, fire, air and in­
ternal organs; the four immaterial ones are time, spatial direc­
tion, ākāśa and selves. Touch is a quality of substances; contact is 
another quality. Each of these four substances – earth, water, fire 
and air – has its own unique qualities. Only the earth is the 
unique locus of smell and water of cold touch. Similarly, fire is 
the substance whose quality is hot touch. 
The Nyāya­Vaiśeṣika categorisation views the body as an en­
tity, excluding the sense organs. Instead, the body is seen as the 
“locus of the sense organs”. The body is the locus of motions 
caused by the self (in that body). Also, pains and pleasures asso­
ciated with organs are experienced in the body and not in the 
senses (see also Bhattacharya 2008: 165 and Jha 1984). Each 
sense organ is composed exclusively of one of the five elements – 
smell of earth, taste of water, touch of air, sight of fire, hearing of 
ether. Because of this unique constitution, the objects of percep­
tion have to be those which are either entirely or mostly com­
posed of the element associated with that perception – so we 
need fire (light) to see and so on. Furthermore, for the Naiyāyikas, 
the sense organs are the ones which are found on the body but 
they are imperceptible. 
Touch is a guna – quality, like taste, smell and contact.3 It is a 
quality only for earth, water, fire and air whereas contact is a 
quality for all the nine substances including ākāśa, time, place, 
self and internal organs. Furthermore, touch is perceived only 
through one sense organ but contact can be by two sense organs. 
Also, contact produces a variety of qualities including pleasure, 
pain, aversion, merit and demerit. However, touch does not pro­
duce these which contact does. 
role of touch and contact
In the context of untouchability, what exactly is the role played 
by these two different qualities of touch and contact?  The 
notion of contact is much broader than that of touch. Contact is a 
quality that inheres in a pair of substances. This means that con­
tact is a quality that is present in the “toucher” and the “touched”. 
If two bodies are in contact with each other, then that contact is 
a symmetrical relation – each body is in contact with the other. 
However, in the case of touch, there seems to be an asymmetry 
since the person who touches is at the same time not being 
touched by the object. So when I say I am touching a chair I do 
not at the same time say the chair is touching me (although Mer­
leau­Ponty would disagree!). Touch in this sense is a specific hu­
man sense unlike contact which is a specific kind of relation be­
tween any two entities. Furthermore, there are many different 
types of contact – the Advaitins describe six types of contact 
(Gupta 1995: 223). 
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Given the semantic complexity of contact and touch, we can 
see a potential problem in the use of the English word “touch”, 
which in common usage often refers to some idea of contact. 
Particularly in the conventional understanding of untouchabil­
ity, the contact with a person who is untouchable is what is 
seen to be defiling. But the point, for the Indian philosophers, 
is that touch is not about contact (which is a relation) but is a 
quality that inheres in the object. This means that the untoucha­
ble manifests the sense of “untouch” within the person. This 
means that the person is untouchable whether or not the 
person comes in contact with another person. We can thus be­
gin to see how the notion of untouchability gets carried into the 
ontology of a sense because of these different interpretations of 
contact and touch. 
Naïve reading
Moreover, the physiological description of the body and the 
senses in these traditions should make us question any naïve 
reading of touch. For example, for a medical tradition like 
Āyurveda, the model of the body is quite different as compared 
to its description in modern biology. Suśruta, the famous surgeon 
of ancient times, classified the body into seven layers of skin. If 
skin is the organ of touch as we understand it now then which of 
these layers of skin are actually involved in the experience of 
touch? To compound this problem further, proponents of 
Sānkhya and Advaita Vedānta describe the body in terms of both 
gross (sthūla śarīra) as well as subtle (sūkṣma śarīra) body 
(B hattacharya 2008: 165). 
Moreover, the sense organs are not to be equated with the bio­
logical eye, tongue, skin, etc. Even in Āyurveda, the sense organs 
which are the usual ear, nose, eye, tongue and skin are only “ex­
ternal appendages” and are merely the “seats of organs and not 
the subtle organs themselves” (Gupta 2008: 211). That is, the 
sense organs are themselves made of “subtle material” and the 
visible skin, for example, is only the seat of the cognitive sense 
organ corresponding to touch. Since the sense organs are subtle, 
in death they leave the body and it is the gross material body 
that decomposes. This means that the qualities associated with 
these sense organs are not restricted to the gross physical body 
because of which these characteristics continue to endure with 
the subtle body. There are implications of such views for under­
standing untouchability. For example, continuation of charac­
teristics through the subtle body would be one way of explaining 
the hereditary continuity of untouchability. What this dis cussion 
alerts us to is the need to employ much wider categories in 
o rder   to make sense of the notion of untouchability. Given that 
Indian philosophical views were reflected in social order in 
v arious ways, it will be useful to first of all interpret untoucha­
bility through categories specific to Indian cultural and 
p hilosophical traditions.  
The view of the senses, the body and their relation to the world 
is described quite differently in the various Indian traditions. To 
engage with the phenomenology of untouchability it is necessary 
to explore the various nooks and corners of these discourses. In 
so doing, various interesting possibilities arise. We have already 
seen how the view of the body, including seven layers of skin, the 
distinction between gross and subtle bodies, the different quali­
ties of touch and contact can all contribute to a more complex 
understanding of untouchability. In what follows, I will use the 
example of skin to make similar points about the discursive 
n ature of untouchability. 
Skin is seen as the organ of touch in both the western and 
I ndian traditions. How is the skin described and understood 
in classical Indian traditions? The skin has an important 
function – that of encompassing and enclosing. It is intrinsically 
related to boundaries and surfaces. Glucklich (1994) uses these 
characteristics to make an insightful reading of dharma. He 
finds an inherent relation between dharma and skin since 
both of them have been symbolically conceived as boundary 
(ibid: 90). Since the boundaries are sensed by the body in a 
particular way this implies, for Glucklich, that “dharma can 
actually be touched”! 
The narrative about the skin illustrates the complexity of its 
relation with touch. The seven layers of skin “are replicated in 
Hindu mythology and in village folklore, with the seven layers of 
the earth” (ibid 98). The symbolism and mythology surrounding 
the skin, along with the theory of karma, suggests a reason for 
the view that the “skin is a primary register of the fruition of sins 
committed in previous births” (ibid: 99). Glucklich identifies two 
fundamental metaphors related to the human body: one of the 
body as a “microcosmic reflection of the world” (Suśrutasaṁhitā) 
and the other as a “self­enclosed space” in an antagonistic rela­
tion with the world (Rg Veda). The first conception considers the 
skin in a spatiocosmological sense. Along with this is the “tempo­
ral metaphor of the skin as a map of character and moral dis­
position” (ibid: 100). While Glucklich considers these views as 
e xplaining certain types of treatment in the Indian medical 
s ystems, I want to explore the relevance of these views to the 
question of untouchability. 
invocation of Dharma
The interpretation of dharma as boundary makes possible the in­
vocation of dharma in the context of untouchability. Most impor­
tantly, it is primarily the skin which can do this job – that is, if 
morality in some sense is to be ascribed to untouchability then it 
can only be done if they share a common characteristic – in this 
case, the character of a boundary. In other words, it is because of 
these complex worldviews underlying body, sense, world and 
dharma that untouchability is chosen as the vehicle for transmit­
ting specific moral or dharmic dictums. The many different prop­
erties of the skin all go to establish the nature of untouchability: 
the skin as the defining quality of a person means that a person 
whose skin is untouchable is himself an Untouchable (note the 
change from an adjective to a noun state in this process, the crea­
tion of a kind of people from an adjectival property of a skin); the 
skin as a “map of character and moral disposition” again illus­
trates how an untouchable’s skin embodies certain moral proper­
ties; once untouchability is inscribed on an individual, then the 
impossibility of crossing the wall of untouchability. All these ex­
plain why it is touch that should be the primary sense in any such 
act of exclusion and proscription.4 Proscribing touch is not only 
biologically and psychologically the most damaging but it is also 
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the only way that matches a much larger narrative of untoucha­
bility. This narrative, contrary to most accounts, is not really 
about the pure and impure as much as it is about the metaphysics 
of the body. 
The Buddhist view of the body is also important here, espe­
cially in the context of untouchability. One reason is that the 
B uddhists rejected a brahminical outlook towards individuals, 
society and god. The other reason is that following Ambedkar, 
Buddhism has become the preferred religion for many dalits. As 
mentioned earlier, the body has often been used as a metaphor 
for the world. For the Buddha, the body was indeed the world in 
that it is within the body that there is the arising and ceasing of 
the world (Lang 2003: 24). The belief in the impurity of the body 
in the Buddhist tradition seems to be all pervading. Right from 
birth to death the body is the site of impurity of various kinds. For 
example, in the Ta-chih-tu Lun a compendium of Mādhyamika 
philosophy, most attention is given to the application of mind­
fulness of the body (ibid: 27). Five impurities of the body are 
identified: womb, seed, body’s nature, body’s characteristics and 
corpse. Right from birth to death, impurity is what characterises 
the human body. 
As Lang notes, for the Buddhists, understanding the body is 
important because it also helps to understand “how human be­
ings remain trapped within them” (ibid: 25). One way to under­
stand the body is to focus on the body during meditation, for 
example, to focus on the activities of breathing. Lang points out 
that such a meditative dissection of the body – being mindfully 
aware of the body and its constituents eliminates the belief in 
self identity. Meditation on a corpse will illustrate the nature of 
impermanence, impurity and pain associated with the body. In 
such practices, two important things happen: the negation 
of the self and recognition that one’s own body is the site or 
locus of impurity. In a worldview such as this, it is impossible to 
place the burden of impurity on another human body while 
appropriating a discourse of purity on one’s own body. There is 
no possibility of supplementation that becomes the hallmark 
of untouchability (more on this later). In this sense, the meta­
physics of Buddhism is indeed one that negates the metaphysics 
of untouchability.
Moral sense
I believe that it is possible to interpret this complexity of touch 
by considering it not as a mere physical sense but as a “moral 
sense”. This might sound a bit odd at the first instance but we 
need to look at our categories a bit more carefully when we con­
sider concepts in Indian philosophy. It is well known that the 
categories of western thought are not isomorphic with Indian 
ones and that distinct western categories do not remain so in the 
Indian view – note how categories such as logic and epistemol­
ogy, metaphysics and epistemology, metaphysics and ethics do 
not remain distinct and separate in the Indian systems (Sarukkai 
2005). So when Glucklich makes the important point that natu­
ral and moral concepts are interrelated in Hinduism it should be 
of no surprise. The implication of this interrelatedness is that 
natural “dirt” gets r elated to moral “dirt”. Or that those who are 
morally “impure” also embody this impurity in their natural 
body. Thus, in literary descriptions of the Candālas they are 
described as “deformed, foul smelling and ugly” (ibid: 66); 
these are characteristics which r eflect and add to the notion of 
impurity associated with that community. 
Something as universal as “water” also has different significa­
tions in these traditions. In the case of water, there is another 
hidden significance about touch itself. Bathing is to be in contact 
with water but the act of touch is not circumscribed by this physi­
cal contact. Contact is always more than the physical one. There 
are different modes present in every single physical contact – one 
which is the physical, of course, but there is also a transcendent 
dimension. The use of language and invocation of words and 
chants as part of the bathing process suggests the transcendent 
contact of the body and words (or sounds, or language). This 
means that the perpetual gap characterising touch are also ones 
that cause complex theories of perception, touch and action in 
Indian thought. Since touch or contact between bodies is 
a lways   more than physical contact, untouchability is not merely 
about physical touching but includes the other spheres inherent 
in touch. 
3 Untouchable in the touch
The idea of the untouchable is essential to the notion of touch. In 
the many philosophical traditions – ancient Greek and Indian or 
contemporary – we are often confronted with this paradox.
Merleau­Ponty invokes the idea of the untouchable through an 
analysis of touching and being touched. Consider the example of 
my right hand touching my left. My body is involved in two proc­
esses simultaneously in this case: it is touching as well as experi­
encing feeling touched. For Merleau­Ponty, these processes can­
not be coincident: not in the body or in the mind or conscious­
ness. What and where does this possibility of this simultaneous 
experience reside if not in body or in consciousness? For Merleau­
Ponty, it resides in the “untouchable”. 
To touch and touch oneself… They do not coincide in the body: the 
touching is never exactly the touched. This does not mean that they 
coincide “in the mind” or at the level of “consciousness”. Something 
else than the body is needed for the junction to be made: it takes place 
in the untouchable. That of the other which I will never touch. But I 
will never touch, he does not touch either … it is therefore not the 
consciousness that is the untouchable… The untouchable is not a 
touchable in fact inaccessible – the u nconscious is not a representation 
in fact inaccessible (M erleau­Ponty 1968: 254).
The implication of this thesis is that “to touch something is 
also and necessarily to be touched by it” (ibid 161). This model 
(related to what he calls as “reversibility”) (Sarukkai 2002) 
makes it possible to understand the relation between the self 
and the other. Just as much as there is a reversal in the roles of 
touching/touched so too is there a reversal between the self and 
the other. In that sense, the “Other functions as my mirror”, 
which means that the self can take up the other’s vantage point 
without coinciding with the other. 
This idea of the untouchable captures an essential mark of the 
act of touching. The visible (touchable) and the invisible (un­
touchable) are in a reversible relation and in a fundamental 
sense it is the invisible (untouchable) that grounds the visibility 
(touchability) of the world: “it is the invisible of this world, that 
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which inhabits this world, sustains it, and renders it visible” 
(ibid: 151).  
In the same tradition but expanding much further, Derrida 
(2005) notes two aspects of the idea of the untouchable. First, 
Derrida suggests an intriguing relation between the untoucha­
ble and law. He makes this connection by beginning with “tact”. 
In the notion of tact he discovers the first notion of a law: 
“the law is always a law of tact” (ibid: 66). For Derrida, tact is 
something like “touch without touching”. He goes on to add that 
in touching, “touching is forbidden: do not touch or tamper with 
the thing itself, do not touch on what there is to touch. Do not 
touch what remains to be touched, and first of all law itself – 
which is the untouchable, before all the ritual prohibitions 
that this or that religion or culture may impose on touching” 
(ibid 66). Derrida’s concern with touch here arises from pro­
scriptions such as those relating to touching another person, say 
a person of the opposite sex or somebody else’s spouse. What is 
the notion of untouchable here? If I am tactless, I may just grab 
hold of a person I do not know. Why is this tactile response 
tactless? Because I do not respect – respect the law that sepa­
rates us, the law of tact and not just the person who is the object 
of my touch. 
These approaches illustrate a way of thematising untouch­
ability, which is very different from the practice of untouchability 
in the Indian context. One difference is that the meanings of un­
touchable in the former case range from not being proper objects 
of touch (such as a concept or a law) to the notion of ever­present 
incompleteness. Also, these examples assume the centrality of 
the autonomous subject. But in the case of untouchability as a 
practice, the impulse against touching is situated within the “ob­
ject”, the untouchable. And most importantly, the difference has 
to do with the objects of sense. Western philosophers  invoke un­
touchability not in terms of objects of non­touch. In the Indian 
context, the creation of untouchables as a category precisely does 
this job of creating a discursive set of objects – and these are ob­
jects of the sense of the non­touch or un­touch. Therefore, just as 
there are objects of vision and hearing, there are objects specific 
to the sense of un­touch – these are the untouchables. 
Not everything which is not touchable is untouchable. Space 
and time are two entities which are both untouchable and un­
seeable.5 Space, time, god, properties and so on are not objects of 
touch but they do not become objects of non­touch. They are not 
objects of the sense of non­touch and in this sense are not 
U ntouchable. Very far objects that we see are untouchable, so are 
mirror images. And so is a stranger – especially if this person is of 
the opposite sex, then s/he is untouchable in most contexts but is 
not an untouchable. 
Nested Notions
The very idea of untouchability, therefore, has many nested no­
tions within it such as the notions related to impossibility, ought, 
negation, inability and so on. At the most basic level, untoucha­
bility as a social practice involves the possibility of touching and 
untouching. We say that a dish is untouched when the dish is in 
front of me and I do not touch it. I do not say that the dish is un­
touchable because if there is nothing that stops me potentially 
from touching the dish then it is open to my touch if I so desire. 
Similarly, it is not that the untouchables cannot be touched but 
they ought not to be touched. The difference in these two posi­
tions is indeed important – something that cannot be touched is 
outside the experience of touch but something that ought not to 
be touched is a touchable entity which should not be touched. 
Untouchability as objects of the sense of non­touch is what cap­
tures this fundamental difference between not touching objects 
because of deleterious consequences (like fire), or presumed con­
tagion (like diseases) and not touching an untouchable. In the 
case of fire or disease, there is no negation of the sense of touch. 
Often, a naïve understanding of the practice of untouchability 
reduces the act of untouchability to such reasons – for example, 
saying that one does not touch untouchables because they are in­
volved in highly demeaning acts of cleaning human waste. But 
this is to misunderstand the phenomenology of untouchability 
because it reduces the act to some functional reasons.
Moreover, even for the untouchables there is no negation of 
touch as a sense. They can touch themselves, they can touch each 
other, they touch their children and so on. A clue to the larger 
philosophical problem can be found in the construction of the 
word itself.
‘Un-touch-able’?
Consider the use of the word untouchable – how does this com­
pound really work? Does it mean un­touch­able? “Un” is a nega­
tion operator. But as we know with negation operators the mean­
ing of the compound drastically changes depending on where the 
negation acts. In this case, does the negation act on the sense of 
touch or on the “ability” to touch? If the former, then it is the im­
possibility of touching (like touching space, say) but if the latter 
then it is the impossibility of the act of touching. In other words, 
does the word untouchable translate into “not­touch able” or 
“touch unable”, that is, unable to touch? The primary difference 
between these two formulations is that they point to two differ­
ent types of inability. In the former, it is the inability placed on 
the object of touch – the object of touch is such that it is inacces­
sible to the sense of touch (space or god), whereas in the latter it 
is such that the subject is unable to fulfil the act of touching. In 
the first case, it points to the nature of the object that is sought to 
be touched while in the second case it is the nature of the subject 
who is unable to touch. It is clear, therefore, that being an Un­
touchable points to the inability of the “toucher” rather than any 
inability of the touched person. Thus, the real site of untouchabil-
ity is the person who refuses to touch the untouchable. 
There are important consequences for the person who does 
not fulfil this potential of touching. The model of touching oth­
ers is that of touching oneself. Thus, in the most primal sense of 
the term, denying oneself the fulfilment of touch leads to deny­
ing oneself the capacity to touch oneself. As much as touching 
fire causes burns, so also the denial of touching an Untouchable 
causes an inability to touch oneself in a certain sense. That is, 
the person who refuses to touch an Untouchable suffers from 
touch­un­ability. This inability to touch is a characteristic of 
the  toucher and not the touched. The moment one creates this 
inability to one’s sense of touch one loses an important aspect 
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of   touch. The impact of not­touching is on both the brahmin 
and   the dalit – both of them cannot fulfil the act of touching but 
they have different phenomenological experiences of the same. 
In the case of the former, it could be associated with psycho­
logical feelings of revulsion, power, rejection and so on whereas 
in the latter it is associated with feelings of humiliation, 
shame    and so on. What in the phenomenon of untouchability 
causes this a symmetry of response even though the act of 
u ntouchability is symmetrical (the person who does not touch is 
also not touched)? 
To be able to answer this and related questions, we have to go 
back and inquire into some aspects of the sense of touch. As men­
tioned earlier, there is no localised organ in the body which does 
the job of touching. The organ of touch is the skin. And if you do 
not like to touch something then you have to “close your skin”. 
But closing the skin is to close the first means of contact with the 
world. As a variety of philosophers and biologists have pointed 
out, we cannot live without the skin although we can live without 
other senses. Simply put, the moment you close the skin you die. 
Thus, it is the partial death/decay of the subject who practises 
untouchability that is the first consequence of practising untouch­
ability. This happens not just because practising untouchability is 
morally wrong but because the person is denying himself a part 
of his ability, his capacity to engage with his own sense. In not 
touching others, he is not able to touch himself. Merleau­Ponty 
repeatedly voices this relation between touching and touching 
oneself: “To touch is to touch oneself” and “Tactile experiencing 
of the other is simultaneously self­experiencing, since otherwise 
I would not be the one experiencing” (quoted in Chrétien 2004: 
84). Extending this, we can see how the denial of touching what 
is touchable is a denial of touching what is touchable within one­
self. This means that one can never practise untouchability only 
with respect to a defined other but in so doing one always and 
necessarily practises untouchability with respect to oneself. 
(Gopal Guru’s invocation of the “folded body” of the brahmin is 
an illustration of this.) 
touch as an action
Unlike other senses, touch is an action. Our standard response 
towards objects is that we automatically reach towards them. But 
the untouchability experience conditions us to be more cautious 
towards touching in general. So the very act of touching becomes 
problematical because every act of touching becomes reflective. 
There is an important consequence of this: touching is no more 
an “automatic” sense but becomes a judgment. In so doing, it gets 
modelled on vision. We know that in the case of vision we see 
objects on the one hand but we also see objects as something. 
“Seeing as” is a reflective process associated with perception. In 
the phenomenology of untouchability, we see a similar move that 
makes touching a matter of judgment. So touching now becomes 
“touching as”. Such a judgment is not about “facts” alone; there is 
a moral code attached to it. This move explains my earlier com­
ment about how touch becomes a “moral sense”.   
As a consequence, every person is first of all potentially an un­
touchable. Every act of touching is now imbued with this sense of 
doubt as to whether the objects of touch we reach towards could 
perhaps be an object of untouchability. This introduces the no­
tion of illusion in touch. In the case of vision, a mirage is seen by 
the eye but its status as a mirage – as an image and not as a real 
object – is grounded in the lack of the possibility of touching a 
mirage. When I reach out to a mirage and try to grasp the object I 
see in the mirage I realise through the failure of the act of touch­
ing that the vision I see is actually a mirage. In the case of 
u ntouchability, an interesting reversal takes place: when I see an 
Untouchable I can see him but I do not reach out to him. I cannot 
use my sense of touch to validate the vision that I see. But I do not 
have the same kind of doubt that I have about a mirage. The 
U ntouchable is real but through the denial of touch he is made 
into a mirage – this is the illusion of touch.  
Thus, every touching is possible only if it first overcomes this 
potential untouchability. The primary sense that defines touch – 
particularly of humans – is not the capacity to touch but the 
p otential of untouchability. This has profound consequences on 
the creation of the narrative of the self as well as on action.  
Finally, what distinguishes the phenomenological dimension 
of untouchability is the relation between touching oneself and not 
touching another. (Note that this is different from the relation 
b etween touching oneself and touching another, a view discussed 
earlier in the context of Merleau­Ponty.) Not touching another is 
actually a manifestation of the problem of touching oneself – this 
shift is precisely what makes untouchability in the Indian context 
unique. This is what differentiates it from other objects which are 
beyond the sense of touch. That is, in the most essential sense 
u ntouchability is actually about the always present, potential 
u ntouchability not of another but of one-self. This is most clearly 
manifested in the way the structure of untouchability unfolds in 
the Hindu practice. 
4 Untouchable in the touch:  
inherent Untouchability of Brahmins 
It has been argued that untouchability is a characteristic of the 
brahmin community. Quigley, for example, emphasises this char­
acteristic in order to support a different reading of caste. He notes 
that brahmins “can be Untouchables, and Untouchables, as ritual 
specialists, are priests” (Quigley 1993: 16). His rereading of caste 
critiques Dumont’s observation that the hierarchy in the caste 
system occurs through the opposition of the pure and the impure. 
He finds Dumont’s characterisation of the opposition between 
spiritual authority (brahmins) and the temporal authority (of 
the kings), which leads to the essential disjunction between 
s tatus and power, as not being empirically supported. Based on 
this, Dumont constructs brahmins and the untouchables as 
e xtreme contrasts. 
Quigley argues that the fact that the notion of impurity is very 
much a part of a brahmin priest implies that one cannot use the 
pure­impure axis, following Dumont, to posit contrasts between 
different castes. Firstly, Quigley points out that there are at least 
six types of “brahmin personae” such as the renouncer, spiritual 
preceptor, non­priest, a personal priest, temple priest and death 
priest (ibid: 54). He then goes on to point out the various ways by 
which these brahmin priests become impure. He also points to the 
reaction of members of other communities who look down upon 
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the brahmins, in terms of their impure status either in a ccepting 
gifts or “who digest the sin, evil, and death of others” (ibid: 80). 
Quigley’s attempt in his book is to make explicit the political 
d imensions involved in the creation of a hierarchy and in p articular 
to emphasise the role of kingship in this act. His and other such 
similar attempts to rewrite the narrative of caste in   I ndia miss one 
essential point: an inquiry into the nature of u n touchability.6 
Ambedkar was aware of the enduring idea of the impure 
among brahmins and other castes but he clearly points out to the 
many differences. He notes that there is only a notion of temporal 
“untouchability” in the case of brahmins and others who are in a 
state of impurity (Ambedkar 1948). There is no encoding of this 
state into one of a permanent stature. The acts of propitiation to 
get rid of the “impure” state are not available to the untoucha­
bles. To point out the brahmins too had moments of untouch­
ability cannot allow one to equate them with the untouchables. 
Ambedkar conceptualises this difference in terms of the impure 
and the untouchable. So, what Quigley calls as untouchable in 
the case of brahmin priests, Ambedkar would call as the impure. 
Is there any merit to creating such a distinction? Ambedkar’s 
d istinction can be retained if we understand that untouchability 
is not about impurity as well as recognising that impurity is not 
untouchability. How do we make this distinction?
Daily rituals
First of all, note that the notion of “untouchability” among brah­
mins is not restricted only to priests in the act of accepting gifts 
or “accepting” death of others. The rituals concerned with impu­
rity begin with daily acts. There are many texts which describe 
elaborate rituals of purification starting from the time one gets 
out of bed. It is also the case that there are states of maḍi when 
the brahmin is “untouchable” to others and these states accrue 
even when not associated with impurity. Almost all the moments 
of auspicious worship, festivals, marriages, daily prayers have 
some rituals of maḍi associated with them.7 
Maḍi is a characteristic of untouchableness. Certain rituals, 
which include most forms of prayers, have to be performed under 
this condition. A common ritual associated with maḍi is the fol­
lowing: the person who is doing a ritual must first of all wash his 
clothes and hang it to dry. Once it is dry it cannot be touched by 
any other person. The person who is “in” maḍi cannot wear the 
clothes unless he or she has had a bath. If the cloth has to be 
moved, it is often done with the help of a stick. If anybody else or 
the maḍi person touches the dried cloth before s/he has had her 
bath, the cloth will have to be washed again.8 When a person is in 
maḍi nobody, including his own children, can touch him.9 What 
this means is that during family rituals family members are com­
pletely untouchable till the ritual is completed. 
Following Ambedkar, we can actually note the important dis­
tinctions in such states of “untouchability” of the brahmins. While 
one can designate such an individual as being in a state of “un­
touchability” the characteristics of untouchability are fundamen­
tally different. First of all, the individual voluntarily takes on the 
mantle of untouchability. If we have to invoke the language of 
p urity, then one can say that untouchability in this case is a mark 
of greater purity and not of greater impurity. Second, the fact that 
such an individual takes it upon himself to be an “untouchable” 
means that he is the autonomous agent for such a decision. More­
over, in most cases, such an individual can come out of this state. 
Third, the punishment for transgression is not one that is similar to 
what is imposed on the involuntary untouchables. The brahmin’s 
“untouchability” is that one does not want to be touched and is not 
that one is refused the touch. The touched­touching d ichotomy 
which informs this position is one that is charac teristic   of touch. I 
agree with Ambedkar that these transient, v oluntary states should 
not be equated with the notion of being an u ntouchable.
However, we should note here another class of brahmins who 
are “permanent untouchables” and these are the Āchāryas (for 
example, in the Rāmānuja tradition). These Āchāryas are perma­
nently untouchable but since their untouchability is already 
i nscribed within the notion of superior untouchability they retain 
this superior nature. Such Āchāryas, for example, will not eat 
food which is cooked even by their wives. They too, like the un­
touchables, gain their status of absolute untouchability through 
birth. The children (at least the eldest son) of Āchāryas usually 
continue to be Āchāryas. Even brahmins in a state of purity 
c annot touch these Āchāryas, or watch them eat and so on. 
U ntouchability for these people is not about attaining a state of 
untouchability and then coming out of it. It is hereditary, it is part 
of tradition and they are in a permanent state of being an 
u ntouchable, even to their family and kin. Here, it is not about 
purity and impurity but about a state of being.10 
Bipolarity among Untouchables
What should capture our attention is the bipolarity in those who 
are untouchables. Agreeing with Ambedkar, we can distinguish 
those caste­individuals in moments of impurity as being in a 
transient state and hence not being an untouchable. But the spe­
cial case of the Āchāryas suggests something radically different. 
It is that the notion of being an untouchable is an essential and 
necessary component of being a brahmin. To be a brahmin is to 
be an untouchable, a permanent untouchable. For most brahmins 
there are only moments of untouchability and they do not have 
the discipline or practice to reach this state of permanent 
u ntouchability. But for the most exalted spiritual leaders the 
m oments of untouchability are permanent. In fact, being a per­
manent untouchable, one that is passed on hereditarily, is what 
distinguishes these brahmin spiritual leaders.  
Here is an intriguing paradox: what distinguishes the state of 
untouchability of these people in contrast to the untouchables of 
Ambedkar? Untouchability in the former case is obviously a posi­
tive virtue whereas in the latter case it is a negative “fact”. What 
is it in the nature of untouchability that allows this accretion of 
value? And what is it that resists the inversion so that the positive 
virtue becomes a characteristic of all untouchables? While there 
may be useful social and political reasons that might explain this 
phenomenon, here I am interested in exploring the metaphysical 
consequences of the same. 
The importance of the idea of the “untouchable” among the 
brahmins is indicative of the essentiality of this notion to the very 
definition of what is it to be a brahmin. A brahmin is not one who 
belongs to a particular community – this is merely the sociological 
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interpretation of being a brahmin.11 Being born into the commu­
nity is not enough to be called a brahmin unless the male mem­
ber undergoes the investiture of the sacred thread. Different sub­
groups then have other initiations that are needed before one can 
become a full­fledged member of this community. (We need to 
reflect on this constant “brahminising” of the brahmins that is 
needed in order to continue to be a member of that community in 
contrast to membership criteria in other castes.) In the case of 
one sect of brahmins, it is necessary for a person to have under­
gone the panchasamskāram which includes the upanayanam 
(s acred thread). Unless a person has done the five samskāras he 
cannot perform most of the rituals. For example, a person who 
has not done these samskāras cannot cook in various rituals. 
O rthodox brahmins (of certain sects) will not eat food that is 
cooked by somebody who has not undergone these samskāras. 
Thus, one becomes a brahmin in ways that are unique to that 
group. But the most important marker in becoming a brahmin 
has to do essentially with the possibility of being an untouchable 
to members of their own community. Moreover, the most 
exalted state is reached when one is in a permanent state of 
u ntouchability. 
It is well known that membership to a brahmin community is 
not through hereditary alone. It is a necessary condition that one 
is born into a brahmin household but it is not sufficient. The suf­
ficient condition that makes one into a brahmin is related to the 
idea of becoming an untouchable. Thus, I would like to suggest 
here that the most dominant marker of being a brahmin lies in 
the concept of untouchability, lies in the potential of an indi vidual 
to become an untouchable. How so? A brahmin is one who not 
only has access to temporal and potential untouchability but also 
to permanent, hereditary untouchability.
But then why is it that the brahmin’s untouchability is valor­
ised whereas the untouchability of the untouchables transforms 
into most inhuman forms of treatment? The philosophical a nswer 
lies in the notion of supplementation, a concept that has been 
e ffectively used by Derrida in a completely different context. 
5 Untouchability and the logic of the supplement
Let me begin with the idea of a sign. A sign is that which stands 
for something else. Our access to the signified is mediated 
through the representation through signs. But the dominant 
m etaphysics underlying this process gives a primacy to that 
which is signified, because of which the sign is always placed 
h ierarchically lower than the signified. 
Derrida engages with this idea through the analysis of writing 
(Derrida 1976). In western thought, writing has dominantly been 
seen to be derivative to speech, which itself is derivative to an 
originary thought, an essence or presence. Whether it is 
R ousseau’s comment that writing is a “dangerous supplement” to 
speech or a more virulent opinion that writing is evil, there is a 
continued tradition of suspicion towards writing. Derrida’s 
c ritique of the binary of speech and writing where speech is seen 
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to be “superior” to writing leads him to suggest that writing does 
not act as a mere “supplement” to speech. 
A supplement suggests that there is a lack in what is supple­
mented. But it cannot just be a mere representation of this lack or 
absence. What this process of supplementation points to is the 
fact that the supplemented is incomplete and necessarily depends 
on the supplement. It is the supplement that brings to presence 
the signified. The consequence of this move is that the signified is 
not accessible to us other than through the presence of the 
s ignifiers – every signified therefore is a trace of the signifier. 
In the case of writing, thought, which is supposed to be repre­
sented by writing twice­removed, is not completely accessible 
without writing. Not only is thought thus incomplete without the 
supplement it is also the case that the supplement adds to the 
original thought. It is the supplement which makes the originary 
possible. Thus, Derrida (1976: 304): “The supplement is always 
the supplement of a supplement. One wishes to go back from the 
supplement to the source: one must recognise that there is a sup­
plement at the source.”  
Speech and Writing
Speech is thus not “independent” of writing; writing is not a mere 
supplementation of speech. As Culler notes, “the thing supple­
mented (speech) turns out to need supplementation because it 
proves to have the same qualities originally thought to character­
ise only the supplement (writing)” (Culler 1997: 11). The logic of 
supplementation gives us various possible alternatives of the 
r elation between the supplement and the supplemented. Barbara 
Johnson (1990) suggests the following possibilities: If A is the 
supplement to B, then the relation between A and B can be one or 
more of the following – added to, substitutes for, superfluous 
a ddition to, makes up for the absence of, makes for deficiency, 
usurps the place of, corrupts the purity of, necessary for restora­
tion of, as that which the other is lost without, is a danger to, is a 
remedy to, protects against direct encounter with, and so on.
Even this brief entry into the idea of the supplement points to 
its potential use in understanding untouchability in the Indian 
context. The popular understanding of caste privileges the axial 
polarity between the brahmins and the untouchables, also artic­
ulated along the pure­impure opposition. Like the speech/ writing 
binary or man/woman, the brahmin/untouchable binary is not 
only a constructed opposition but one in which the latter is inferi­
orised with respect to the former. This allows us to consider the 
possibility that the untouchable acts as a supplement to the brah­
min. It is moreover a “dangerous supplement” and one that is in­
trinsically “dangerous” to the signified, the brahmin. It m oreover, 
to use one characterisation of Johnson’s logic of the supplement, 
“corrupts the purity of” the brahmin. To use another characteri­
sation, it “protects against direct encounter with” the brahmins. 
The discourse of the untouchable illustrates its c onstruction as a 
supplement in these various descriptions. 
Derrida’s argument that the supplement is all that there is, that 
the supplement is to be found at the source, allows us to engage 
with the dominant discourse of untouchability in a different 
manner. The discourse on brahmins and untouchability clearly 
indicates that the notion of untouchability is seen as a supplement to 
the notion of a brahmin. However, the critical analysis of the sup­
plement suggests that it is impossible to sustain untouchability as 
a “mere” supplement. It, instead, is to be found in the source – the 
brahmin – itself. The example of the permanent untouch able 
among b rahmins is an added illustration of the importance of the 
idea of untouchability among brahmins. To be the highest brah­
min is to be an untouchable but not of the kind that characterises 
the untouch ables. In other words, the necessity to construct a 
group called the untouchables arises in large part due to the in­
herent presence of the notion of untouchability in the very idea of 
a brahmin. 
What then are the implications of this argument? It is first and 
foremost the recognition that untouchability as a notion is intrin­
sic to brahmins. And this notion of untouchability is not about the 
rituals associated with impurity. It is actually about the charac­
teristics of the non­temporal, permanent and hereditary charac­
teristics of untouchability. The creation of a supplementary com­
munity of untouchables is a necessary consequence of the inabil­
ity of brahmins to attain the “pure” state of untouchable. But in 
creating this supplement the pure state of untouchability that 
characterises the Āchāryas, for example, is converted into a neg­
ative virtue. In other words, the untouchables are the supple­
mented Āchāryas and this supplementation is needed for the pos­
sibility of having a community of brahmins whose members no 
longer carry the burden of “pure untouchability”. Thus, if there 
were no creation of a supplemented class of untouchables there is 
no possibility of having a community of brahmins. The untouch­
ables are the supplemented brahmins in the final analysis. In 
Derridean terms, the brahmins are like speech and the untoucha­
bles are like writing. Ironically, the literal meaning of a brahmin 
is essentially related to speech and the dalits have been essen­
tially reduced to possessors of a body – the material substratum 
on which writing is possible. Speech is temporary, transitory and 
is evanescent – and is untouchable! Writing is permanent, em­
bodies the idea of “hereditary” – and ironically, is touchable! The 
possibility of such reversal clearly illustrates the logic of supple­
mentation. Thus we can see how the critique of speech suggests a 
way of critiquing the dichotomy between brahmins and dalits. 
process of supplementation
How exactly does this process of supplementation act to create a 
community of untouchables as something necessary for the sus­
tenance of the idea of a brahmin? This occurs through the crea­
tion of inverting the elements of the experience of touching. The 
supplementation occurs through the change from “not wanting 
to be touched” to “refusing to touch”. It is interesting that both 
these imperatives come from the brahmin – that is, the untouch­
able brahmin is one who refuses to let others touch him and 
refuses to touch others. In the case of the untouchables, neither is 
the case. I suggest that such a shift can happen only in the case of 
touch because of the touch­touched relation. It is in this sense 
that untouchability as we know it today arises in consequence of 
the metaphysics of touch and the supplementation of the shift 
from being touched to touching. And since touching is always an 
integral part of being touched they can only be in a reversible 
r elation and not in a hierarchical relation thereby suggesting 
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Notes
1  It is difficult to summarise the characteristics that 
would define an Untouchable in its full generality. 
The standard accounts that use pollution/purity 
to define this class run into trouble because of 
many exceptions, both from within that class and 
outside it. One classification that is more inclu­
sive is as follows: The untouchables in Indian so­
ciety are those who are “(1) economically de­
pendent and exploited, (2) victims of many kinds 
of discrimination, and (3) ritually polluted in a 
permanent way” (Deliege 1999: 2). See also 
Beteille (1992).
2  In addition to these two terms, Bangla, for exam­
ple, commonly uses another term – saṁsparśa, 
which in Bangla “means social contact of the kind 
that makes it possible for lines of influence to 
travel from one person to the other, and is durable 
and sustained contact.” (I thank Probal Dasgupta, 
personal communication, for this input.)
3  Quality is one imperfect translation of guna. Im­
perfect since gunas are not repeatable like quali­
ties are, for example.  
4  Although there is also the Unseen (see Ambedkar 
1948) the force of untouchability lies specifically 
in the act of touch.
5  As far as space and time are concerned, there 
have been different claims on the possibility of 
sensing space ranging from Berkeley’s view 
that it can be touched to Nyāya’s view that it can 
be heard.
6  Quigley’s later book (2005), has a section on king­
ship and untouchability but says little of value about 
the nature of untouchability and misses the funda­
mental import of untouchability in brahmins.
7  See Fuller (1979) and Bean (1981), for descriptions 
of maḍi in different communities. These ap­
proaches, like most others, are primarily con­
cerned in understanding this practice in terms of 
purity and pollution. What I am suggesting here is 
the need to focus on the concept of untouchability 
as a primary term in this analysis, which then 
leads to a very different reading of these practices 
as well as creating possibilities of new political 
interventions. 
8  There are differences in this practice across com­
munities. Also, there are various subtleties 
present such as the distinction between cotton 
and silk cloth in relation to maḍi.
9  Similar states are applicable to the women also.
10 In the brahminical Rāmānuja tradition, there are 
many stories of non­brahmins (including dalits) 
who occupy highly respected positions in this 
movement. The 12 ālwars – the supreme spiritual 
figures for this community – include non­brah­
mins. The Divya-Prabandam is the “Tamil Veda” 
and is the central text for this community. Argua­
bly, the most important part of this text is another 
text called the Thiruvāimozhi. Verse 3­7­9 of this 
text is roughly translated as follows: “Those who 
do not belong to the known four castes but to the 
most backward called ‘Candālas’ – not having an­
ything to be admired of – if they are devotees of 
Lord Viṣnu then not only they  but their disciples 
too are my God.” There are other such sentiments 
in the text. Such references to the other castes, 
along with folk narratives of important non­ 
brahmin and dalit persona in this brahminical 
tradition, suggest once more the difficulty in 
u nderstanding caste dynamics in terms of rigid 
distinctions based on some ideas of purity and 
i mpurity.  
11  See Pandian’s (2008), analysis of the creation of 
the brahmin community in Tamil Nadu. 
12  Wikipedia entry for Rudāli.
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that   the brahmins and the untouchables actually exemplify a re­
versible relation between each other. 
These are not just theoretical musings without empirical sup­
port! An interesting social phenomenon in Indian societies is the 
existence of communities who specialise in carrying various bur­
dens of other communities. The professional mourners of Rajasthan 
are a community of women who do the job of mourning when 
somebody dies. This is one characterisation: these are women of a 
lower caste who are “hired as professional mourners upon the 
death of upper caste males... Their job is to publicly e xpress grief 
of family members who are not permitted to display emotion due 
to social status.”12 Quigley (1993) mentions the M ahabrahmins 
whose job is to carry the spirits of the dead. Indian society is filled 
with such examples of “outsourcing”. In another book where he 
relates kingship and untouchability, Quigley gives the example of 
brahmins who hug a dying king in order to take the king’s sin 
away (Quigley 2005: 130). Having absorbed the sins of the dying 
king, the embodied sinner leaves the kingdom never to return. 
This practice continues to this day; Quigley cites the example of 
the royal murders in Nepal a few years back when similar rituals 
were performed. In the case of the untouchables, the untouchabil­
ity of the brahmins is outsourced to the dalits who then carry that 
burden. Recognising this move of supplementation is first of all a 
political recognition and enables specific political action. 
Saying all this might not be saying much given the inhuman 
practices associated with untouchability. However, we should also 
remember that the deconstructive moves initiated through the 
analysis of the logic of supplementation have generated new and 
liberatory ideas which have been important in struggles against 
various types of hegemony. There is no reason that the same can­
not happen in the case of the liberation of the untouchables also. 
Such a phenomenology of untouchability also does something 
else: it allows us to develop an ethics which is based on touch. 
While ethical responses to untouchability often draw upon politi­
cal ideas such as individual freedom there is a more foundational 
ethical response possible, one based on an ethics of touch. 
